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In their book The Power to Tax, Brennan and Buchanan have pointed to a central weakness 
of the traditional theory of public finance and especially of the theory of optimal taxation: 
This approach overlooked the problem of governmental power and the tendency of this power 
to be abused. It was important to demonstrate how grossly misleading the optimal taxation 
theory appears to be once the problem of power is considered. Nevertheless, Brennan and 
Buchanan’s suggestions for constitutional rules are no less misleading, after all. Technically 
speaking, the public-policy implications of their approach are only valid under extremely 
unrealistic assumptions. What is worse: Shifting these assumptions somewhat closer to reality 
does not just reduce the extent to which the public-policy implications of their approach are 
true but rather turns them completely upside down. Hence, Barry Weingast’s (1993, p. 287) 
fundamental trade off, according to which a ‘government strong enough to protect property 
rights is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens’, remains unsolved. 
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In ihrem Buch The Power to Tax haben Brennan und Buchanan auf eine zentrale Schwäche 
der traditionellen finanzwissenschaftlichen Theorie aufmerksam gemacht: Dieser Ansatz 
übersieht das Problem der Regierungsmacht sowie der Neigung der Regierung, diese Macht 
zu missbrauchen. Es war wichtig zu zeigen, wie grob irreführend der Ansatz der optimalen 
Besteuerung erscheint, wenn man einmal das Problem der Macht berücksichtigt. 
Nichtsdestotrotz sind Brennans und Buchanans Vorschläge für konstitutionelle Regeln 
letztlich nicht weniger irreführend. Technisch ausgedrückt sind die wirtschaftspolitischen 
Implikationen ihres Ansatzes nur unter extrem unrealistischen Annahmen gültig. Schlimmer 
noch ist: Wenn man diese Annahmen etwas näher an die Realität heranrückt, dann reduziert 
sich nicht einfach der Grad, zu dem diese Implikationen zutreffend sind, sondern es verkehren 
sich diese Implikationen in ihr glattes Gegenteil. Daher bleibt der von Barry Weingast (1993, 
S. 287) formulierte fundamentale Zielkonflikt, wonach „eine Regierung, die stark genug ist, 
um die Eigentumsrechte zu schützen, auch stark genug ist, um das Vermögen ihrer Bürger zu 
konfiszieren“, weiterhin ungelöst. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Nobel-Prize laureate James Buchanan is probably still the most prominent 
representative of the public-choice school. At least in the Buchanan tradition, public-choice 
theory deals, at its heart, with the question of how far legitimate governmental power reaches 
and how government’s power can be restricted to precisely that scope. Since the publication 
of  The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), the philosophical basis of 
public-choice theory for legitimizing government has been a contractarian one. This basis has 
been challenged by some authors (see, e.g., Hardin 2002) and it has been approved by others. 
However, we do not intend to discuss the question of legitimacy of government here. Rather, 
we revisit the next step, the one which aims at containing the scope of government activities 
to whatever is viewed as legitimate. This step has been taken by Brennan and Buchanan a 
quarter of a century ago in their much celebrated book The Power to Tax (Brennan/Buchanan, 
1980). The authors did so without leaving their contractarian ground.  
 
The idea behind this book is indeed striking and, given the broadly observable tendency of 
governments to expand, it was necessary to express a central weakness of the mainstream of 
the public-finance literature and, especially, the literature on the theory of optimal taxation. 
Optimal-taxation theory clearly overlooked the central problem that governments may abuse 
their power to tax, and that they may shift their activity beyond what can be viewed as 
legitimate. And optimal taxation theory could not explain why there is such a tendency in the 
first place, since it simply assumed the problem away by help of the benevolent-dictator 
model. As a consequence, in order to enable governments to draw tax revenues with the 
lowest possible excess burden, optimal-taxation theory assigned the maximum possible power 
to governments by way of inverse elasticity rules and the like (Mirrlees, 1982). In doing so, 
optimal-taxation theorists inadvertently endowed the government with a maximal potential for 
exploiting its constituency. Hence, it was of overwhelming importance to set a counterpoint to 
the mainstream of public finance, and this has been done by Brennan and Buchanan. Thanks 
to these authors, we are today aware of the fact that there is a trade off between assigning the 
power necessary for reducing excess burden of taxation on the one hand and limiting the 
scope of government activity on the other hand. Without this contribution, the theory of 
public finance and, more broadly, political philosophy would not be what it is today. 
Notwithstanding these merits, however, the theoretical concept chosen by Brennan and 
Buchanan for containing government’s power misses the point, after all. Technically      2
 
speaking, it is only valid under grossly unrealistic assumptions. As a result, their public-policy 
implications are misleading at best. The central implication of the Brennan-Buchanan 
approach is that, unlike in optimal taxation theory, high tax rates should be prohibited on tax 
bases with a low elasticity, or taxation of such bases should be prohibited altogether. The 
underlying logic is that this limits the scope of taxation since the number of remaining tax 
bases shrinks with every precluded tax base.  
 
In this paper, we do not follow the usual lines of criticism of the Brennan-Buchanan 
approach. Rather, we mainly agree with Brennan and Buchanan in all but one points (and in 
all but the contractarian point even strictly so). Consequently, the one critical point raised in 
this paper is a different one, and it may even seem to be a minor technical detail. However, it 
is not. It is Brennan and Buchanan’s assumption that, unless their constitutional rules are 
applied, there are no further limits to governmental activities whatsoever. Or strictly speaking, 
existing formal or informal limitations on governmental activities are not binding. As a 
consequence, governments will always exploit all available tax bases to a maximum at any 
time. By way of this assumption, Brennan and Buchanan rule out any scope for governments 
to switch from one tax base to another in the case of the introduction of some constitutional 
tax restrictions, since all technically possible tax bases will already be fully exploited prior to 
the introduction of such a restriction. It is this assumption which is at the heart of the critique 
of Brennan and Buchanan’s approach, as it will be presented in this paper. The reason is that 
any relaxation of this assumption does not only reduce the validity of Brennan and 
Buchanan’s findings but rather turns them completely upside down.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, traditional optimal taxation theory is 
compared to the Leviathan theory as outlined by Brennan and Buchanan. On this basis, a 
general theoretical framework is introduced, which will be used in the following sections. In 
the third section a restriction is introduced that binds governments to a certain minimum 
utility level of the median voter. In the fourth section a demand restriction for governmentally 
supplied public goods is assumed. Finally, in the fifth section the case of productive public 
goods like public infrastructure is analyzed. A common discussion of the findings is presented 
in section 5. 
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II. OPTIMAL TAXATION VERSUS LEVIATHAN THEORY  
Intuitively, the difference between optimal taxation theory and Leviathan theory of 
taxation can best be grasped with the help of a simple diagram. In figure 2.1, a commodity tax 
on two different tax bases is illustrated. The demand curve DH for good H is flatter than the 
demand curve DL for good L. Generally speaking, DL represents a more comprehensive tax 
base. The net (before tax) price for each good is indicated by q1. The tax revenue necessary 
for financing an optimal amount of public goods is assumed to be R1, the shaded rectangle in 
the left part of the diagram. This tax revenue can be generated by either levying a tax rate t1 
on good H or by levying an equally high tax rate on good L. In both cases, the resulting tax 
revenue would be indicated by the rectangle R1. However, in the case of the tax base H, the 
deadweight loss is as high as the triangle ACD and, thus, higher than in the case of tax base 
L, where the deadweight loss amounts to only ABD. As a result, a benevolent dictator would 
choose to tax the more comprehensive tax base L and, in so doing, he would minimize the 
deadweight loss from taxation. 
 
But can a government realistically be described as a benevolent dictator? Brennan and 
Buchanan are in doubt, and rightly so. Their alternative “Leviathan model” is characterized by 
two crucial features: Firstly, a government of the Leviathan type is modeled as a tax-revenue 
maximizer; and secondly, there is no political restriction on Leviathan’s efforts to maximize 
tax revenue. He is only restricted by some economic forces like the degree of elasticity of the 
respective tax base. But neither democracy nor the threat of political uprisings or legal 
restrictions of any kind apply with respect to Leviathan’s power to tax.  
 
Look at the right part of figure 2.1. for an illustration of the implications. Given that there 
are again two bases for a commodity tax described by the two demand curves DH and DL, 
government will tax both up to the point where marginal revenue equals the net price q1 of 
both goods. In a Leviathan equilibrium of the Brennan-Buchanan type, total tax revenue 
amounts to the sum of the rectangles ACDE and ABFG. Each of the rectangles alone will 
already be bigger or, at least, as big as the rectangle R1. The reason is that an unrestricted 
Leviathan government will choose a tax rate which maximizes tax revenue from each and 
every tax base. Hence, the tax-revenue rectangle of a benevolent dictator can never be bigger 
than each rectangle from the right part of figure 2.1. Moreover, since total tax revenue is the 
sum of both rectangles from the right part of the figure, this total tax revenue will always be at      4
 























Figure 2.1.: Optimal taxation versus Leviathan taxation 
 
The suggestion derived by Brennan and Buchanan is thus to restrict the government’s 
power to tax to one of the two tax bases on a constitutional basis. According to this restriction, 
the Leviathan government’s access to taxable bases will be limited to the least comprehensive 
tax base. By contrast, the suggestion of optimal-taxation theory is not only to assign the most 
comprehensive tax base to the government but rather to assign all available tax bases to the 
government. Only then can a welfare maximizing benevolent dictator make use of the 
broadest possible set of tax instruments in order to draw the necessary tax revenue with the 
smallest possible excess burden. The crucial point, however, is that a government that intends 
to draw not a given tax revenue from its citizens but the highest possible tax revenue will not 
use the comprehensiveness of a certain tax base in order to minimize excess burden, but it will 
rather misuse the comprehensiveness in order to maximize tax revenue.  
 
The implications of optimal-taxation theory on the one hand and Leviathan theory of 
taxation on the other hand could thus hardly be more different. Note, however, that this does 
not follow from any Leviathan model of government but only from the particular model, as 
specified by Brennan and Buchanan. The latter, though, is by far not the only possible one. 
Rather, one can think of a number of alternative specifications of Leviathan governments 
which are all at least as plausible as the one specified by Brennan and Buchanan. Moreover,      5
 
alternative specifications may fit reality no less than the one by Brennan and Buchanan. The 
problem is that Brennan and Buchanan’s constitutional rules only follow from their particular 
specification of a Leviathan government. In brief: Some alternative specifications of a 
Leviathan government which are no less realistic and in which Leviathan is no less selfish 
turn all the constitutional suggestions upside down. 
 
The crucial point of the following considerations is that the assumption of a government 
which is completely untouched by any political restrictions seems to be too far away from 
reality. True, Brennan and Buchanan only introduced this assumption in order to define some 
kind of a worst-case scenario. It seems to follow that Brennan and Buchanan’s constitutional 
implications remain true to a somewhat less dramatic extent when this assumption is relaxed. 
Hence, as Brennan and Buchanan argue, by grounding the constitutional considerations on the 
worst-case scenario one can make sure to be on the secure site (see: Brennan/Buchanan, 1980, 
pp. 19-20). If there turn out to be some political limitations on Leviathan’s power to tax and, 
additionally, some constitutional limits to that power have been installed, then all the better 
so. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is wrong, no matter how convincing it seems to be at 
first glance. Rather, constitutional limits on Leviathan’s tax base, combined with some pretty 
realistic political restrictions, can leave the citizens worse off, as compared to a situation in 
which there is no constitutional restriction at all. In the next sections, we analyze a Leviathan 
government which is subject to certain political restrictions. 
 
We analyze the different cases on the basis of a unique simple theoretical framework. 
Throughout the paper, we base our considerations on two tax bases. The tax basis H (for high 
comprehensiveness) is more comprehensive than the tax basis L (for low comprehensiveness). 
In all but one case we consider a commodity tax on commodities of the quantity L and H. 
Finally, as in Brennan and Buchanan (1980), we assume simple linear demand functions for 
both goods.  
 
The revenue function of the government will then be as follows: 
H t L t R H L ⋅ + ⋅ = . (2.1.) 
The utility function of the median voter is the following: 
). H , L ( U U =  (2.2.)      6
 
The income restriction of the median voter is: 
H ) t P ( L ) t P ( Y H H L L ⋅ + + ⋅ + = . 
Hence, the following indirect utility function applies for the utility-maximizing quantities 
L* and H*:  
) Y , t , t ( V *) H *, L ( U H L = . (2.3.) 
Maximizing indirect utility subject to any given revenue level, represented by equation 














The left-hand side of condition 2.4. is represented by the indifference curves V in figure 
2.2. These indifference curves indicate the disutility of taxation from the point of view of the 
respective consumer. The higher the tax rates the lower will be the remaining net income. 
Hence, (indirect) utility will be the higher the closer the respective indifference curve is to the 
origin of the graph. The slope of the respective tangency lines shows the utility-maximizing 
consumption structure H*/L* for any given pair of tax rates tH and tL. 
 
The revenue maximizing tax-rate structure, in turn, can be determined by deriving 2.1. 
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Figure 2.2. Disutility from taxation 




















≡ η  for  i=H,L.  (2.7.) 
Condition 2.7. shows the ratio H*/L* for which tax revenue is at its maximum for any 
given indirect utility level. The revenue-maximizing tax rates tH* and tL* are then determined 
by H* and L* through the respective demand curves, so that the tax structure for a revenue 
maximum is also given by 2.7.. The condition is determined by the two price elasticities of 
demand. Since the (H*/L*)-ratio is given by the tangency lines to the indifference curves in 
figure 2.2, any corresponding tangency point (e. g. A or B) indicates a revenue maximum for 
a given utility level. By connecting all tangency points, a straight line R* results which is 
orthogonal to the tangency lines and indicates a revenue-maximizing tax structure  * t *; t H L  
for each given indirect utility level V. Since we assume linear demand curves for both goods, 
there is an absolute maximum of tax revenues that can be generated for each good at 
max
H t a n d  
max
L t , respectively. These two tax rates represent the peaks of the respective Laffer curves. 
Any increase above these two tax rate will lower tax revenues.   
 
Based on this simple framework, we can now approach the analysis of tax-base restrictions 
of the Brennan-Buchanan type under Leviathan conditions as well as under some further 
restrictions that may apply in the real world.       8
 
III. UTILITY-RESTRICTIONS ON REVENUE MAXIMIZATION 
As long as a Leviathan government is by no means restricted in its power over its citizens, 
it will always exhaust all tax bases up to its respective maximum. In figure 3.1. the 
corresponding tax rates are again 
max
H t  and 
max
L t . In this section, however, we analyze a 
Leviathan government which is not fully unrestricted but rather faces a political restriction of 
the following type: Any government which fails to leave a minimum utility level V
50 to the 
median voter will be removed from office (Edwards/Keen, 1996; Wrede, 1998). In such a 
case, Leviathan must reduce the tax rates to a point on the indifference curve V
50. The one 
combination of tax rates which maximizes tax revenue for a given utility level V
50 lies in point 
A with  * t *; t H L . 
Point A hence shows the peculiar duality of a benevolent dictator’s strategy on the one 
hand and that of a revenue-maximizing Leviathan government on the other. In point A, there 
is a utility maximum for the respective consumer-citizen at each given level of tax revenue. 
Hence, a benevolent dictator would choose such a point, depending on the tax revenue he 
needs for financing an optimal amount of public goods according to the well known 
Samuelson rule (Samuelson, 1954). At the same time, however, such a point represents a 
revenue maximum for each given level of utility. That means that a Leviathan government 
would also choose such a point as long as it is bound to a certain minimum utility level which 
has to be left for the voters.  
 
What, then, will happen if a tax rule of the Brennan-Buchanan type (henceforth: BB tax 
rule) is implemented into the respective country’s constitution? Assume that this rule 
stipulates a certain upper limit 
l
H t  for the tax rate of the more comprehensive tax base. If 
Leviathan did simply reduce the tax rate on H to 
l
H t  there were indeed not only a reduction in 
tax revenues but also a rise in median voter’s utility level, since the ensuing tax structure 
would be the one represented by point B. However, given the constitutional rule, point B is 
not an optimum for Leviathan. Rather, it would be optimal for the government to move to 
point C. By raising the tax rate on the less comprehensive tax base from tL* to tL**, the 
government can compensate for at least a part of its revenue loss. The resulting tax revenue 
will nevertheless fall short of the maximum for a given V
50 since point A represents a revenue 
maximum for a given V
50.  





















Figure 3.1.: Reelection restriction and a Brennan-Buchanan tax rule 
 
Hence in terms of tax revenues, Leviathan’s power to tax will indeed be limited by the 
Brennan-Buchanan tax rule. In terms of utility, however, the median voter will not be better 
off at all. The reason is that, if the V
50-utility restriction of the government is binding, and if 
Leviathan will always maximize tax revenue (as assumed by Brennan and Buchanan), then 
the government will always exhaust any scope for additional tax revenues at the expense of 
the median voter’s utility level until V
50 is reached. Hence, whereas the BB tax rule will 
reduce the government’s tax revenue this reduction will not make the citizens any better off. 
The deeper reason is that the BB tax rule forces the government into deadweight losses. 
Because of the upper limit of the tax rate tH the government has no choice but to apply an 
inefficient tax structure, hence the dead weight losses. Indeed, total tax burden, defined as the 
citizens’ tax bill plus dead weight losses, will strictly remain untouched by the BB tax rule. 
Only the structure of the total tax burden changes. The rise in dead weight losses will be 
precisely as high as the reduction in the tax bill, leaving the citizens’ utility level untouched.  
 
As a result of the constitutional rule, Leviathan is forced to produce waste. It must be 
confessed, however, that the burden of this waste is not born by the citizens but by Leviathan 
himself. One may be inclined to downplay such a waste and point to the reduction in tax 
revenue instead. However, for the society as a whole, there is clearly a loss, since the reduced 
tax revenue could, at least in principle, be used for some utility increases somewhere, while 
the raised excess burden comes as a pure waste. One may be willing to ignore this waste since     10
 
the burden of this waste is compensated for by lower taxes, so that, in the end, it is the 
government alone how bears this burden. Nevertheless, it remains true that the lost revenue 
could have been used for raising the citizens’ utility, at least in principle. It seems thus 
reasonable to draw attention to some alternative constitutional rules apart from those 
suggested by Brennan and Buchanan. In doing so, we cannot afford to ignore the spending 
side of the government any longer. Specifically, we must not ignore questions like the 
following: If, for whatever reason, there was an increase in government’s tax revenue, how 
much of that additional revenue would a (real world) government be forced to spend in terms 
of public goods? Or, alternatively, if government faces a loss in revenue stemming from a 
constitutional rule of the Brennan-Buchanan type: How much of this loss can government 
translate into a reduction in the supply of public goods? We take these questions into 
consideration in the next section. 
IV. PUBLIC-GOODS SUPPLY, REELECTION PROBABILITY, AND REVENUE 
MAXIMIZATION 
In this section we assume that governments increase the supply of public goods as long as 
this raises government’s tax revenue (Apolte, 2001). At the same time we consider a demand 
restriction for public goods which is articulated by the median voter through the political 
process. Again, we stay as close to the assumptions used by Brennan and Buchanan as 
possible (see Brennan/Buchanan, 1980, pp. 76 – 79). This demand restriction determines the 
maximum demand for public goods and, at the same time, the maximum obtainable tax 
revenue R
max for Leviathan. We assume further that Leviathan will always try to keep the 
total tax burden (including excess burden) as low as possible for any given revenue in order to 
raise his reelection probability. 
 
The maximum tax revenue R
max can be derived as follows. Assume first that government 
will always keep a share (1-α) of tax revenue for own (perhaps wasteful) consumption and 
spend the rest for public goods of the amount X. Assume further that public goods are bought 
by the government on a perfectly competitive market to the price PX. Then spending for 
public goods will be: 
X P R X ⋅ = ⋅ α . (4.1.) 
Consider now a simple linear demand function for public goods, as in Brennan/Buchanan 
(1980, p. 77):     11
 
X g e PX ⋅ − = . (4.2.) 
Combining 4.1. and 4.2. yields the following revenue function: 
α
2 X g X e
R
⋅ − ⋅
= . (4.3.) 






= . (4.4.) 
The maximum revenue level R







X max . (4.5.) 
Leviathan will now maximize the probability π of reelection, subject to the restriction that 
total tax revenue be R=R
max. The probability of reelection is a function of the utility level of 
the median voter which, in turn, is a function of tax burden as described by the disutility lines 
of taxation above. Hence the maximization problem for Leviathan is identical to that 














See figure 4.1. for the implications. A utility maximum of the median voter, subject to a 
tax revenue level R
max, is represented by point A. This point is a tangency point of the 
indifference curve V0 with a line the slope of which represents L*/H*, thus representing a 
utility maximum of the median voter for the given revenue level R
max. Hence, given the 
obtainable tax revenue level R
max for the government, V0 respresents the highest utility level 
for the median voter and, by implication, the highest reelection probability. A government 
which is not limited in its scope for action by any further restriction will hence choose point 
A.  
 
How does this result change once a BB tax rule is introduced? Suppose the same rule as in 
section 3, limiting the tax rate on the more comprehensible tax base H to 
l
H t . In such a case, 
the government would again be forced to raise the tax rate tL on the less comprehensive tax     12
 
base in order to compensate for the revenue loss from tax base H. Note that any point along 
the indifference curve V0 is associated with lower tax revenues as compared to point A. 
Hence, any point that fully or at least partly compensates for the revenue loss due to the BB 
tax rule must be located on an indifference curve which is north-east of V0, e.g. point B on 
indifference curve V1. Whether the tax revenue level R
max can be recovered by the rise in tL 




H t ; t ) yields more or less in revenue than R
max. If tax 
revenue is R




















Figure 4.1.: Demand restriction and a Brennan-Buchanan tax rule 
In any case, however, the utility level of the median voter will drop, since he will end up 
on an indifference curve which represents a lower level of utility. Again, the reason behind 
this result is that the constitutional rule, in combination with some additional political 
restrictions, forces the government to produce waste. Note that revenue is at R
max in point A 
as well as in point B whenever the government voluntarily chooses B. In point A however, the 
citizens are better off as compared to point B. They have the same tax bill in B, but they incur 
higher dead weight losses. Now compare point B with C. Whereas the utility level is identical 
in both points tax revenue is lower in B than in C. Hence, starting from B, tax revenue could 
be raised without reducing the utility level of the citizens.  
 
Summing up, the BB tax rule once again forces the government to choose an inefficient tax 
structure. In this case, however, the economic burden of the ensuing waste is not born by the     13
 
government like in the previous section. Rather, the burden is shifted to the citizens, which 
are definitely harmed by the constitutional rule. By contrast, there will not even be the 
slightest limitation of Leviathan’s power to tax associated with a constitutional rule of the 
Brennan-Buchanan type in this case. 
 
Our next example deals with a Leviathan government which supplies productive public 
goods, i.e. public goods such as public infrastructure that enter the macroeconomic production 
function and raise productivity of the (other) production factors.  
V. LEVIATHAN AND PRODUCTIVE PUBLIC GOODS 
The point in this section is that productive public goods raise national income of a country. 
This, in turn, raises potential tax revenues. Any revenue-maximizing government will hence 
raise the supply of productive public goods up to the point where the marginal increase in tax 
revenues due to an increased provision of productive public goods becomes zero. However, it 
seems reasonable not to assume a merely revenue-maximizing government in this specific 
case. The reason is that, under these circumstances, Leviathan may rather be interested in 
maximizing tax revenue net of expenditures for the public goods, for it is only this excess 
revenue that the government can freely dispose of. Brennan and Buchanan have taken such a 
case into consideration and claimed that it would not make a crucial difference to pure 
revenue maximization with respect to their argument. Hence we can apply such a variant of 
Leviathan behavior without doing any harm to the point raised by Brennan and Buchanan.  
 
To be specific, we define government rents Q as total tax revenue R minus expenditures 
for public goods. The amount of public goods supplied by the government is indicated by X. 
The public goods are bought on a perfectly competitive market to the price PX. A rent-
maximizing government will then raise the supply in the public good until marginal 
productivity of the public good equals its price, or until  X X P F = , with FX indicating marginal 
productivity of the public good. In addition to the public good we consider two private inputs 
N (labor) and K (capital). Labor is assumed to be relatively inelastic in supply as compared to 
capital. Hence, labor is the factor which is comparatively vulnerable to tax exploitation by 
Leviathan, as compared to capital. We apply a simple production function of the following 
type: 
γ β β X N K Y
1 ⋅ ⋅ =
−  with:  1 0 < β <    and:  1 0 < < γ  (5.1.).     14
 
As long as Leviathan is not restricted by any constitutional rule, he is free to tax both labor 
as well as capital. For reasons of simplicity, we consider a simple tax on the stock of labor 
input and capital input. Tax revenue is thus:  
N t K t R N K ⋅ + ⋅ = .   (5.2.) 
We assume perfectly competitive factor markets. Hence, factor prices of labor and capital 
are equal to their respective marginal productivity FN and FK. The net capital price is thus 
K K t F r − =  and the net wage is  L L t F w − = . Rewritten, this is  r F t K K − =  and  w F t N N − = . 
In combination with 5.2. we get the following definition of governments rents: 
X P N ) w ) X , K , N ( F ( K ) r ) X , K , N ( F ( Q X N K ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅ − = . (5.3.) 
The optimal amount of X must satisfy the usual first-order condition, derived from 5.3.: 
. P N F K F X NX KX = ⋅ + ⋅  (5.4.) 
Applied to our production function we will have: 
1 1
KX x N K K F
− − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅
γ β β γ β  and 
1 1
NX x N K ) 1 ( N F
− − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅
γ β β γ β . (5.5.) 
Also, we can find: 
1 1
X x N K F
− − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
γ β β γ . (5.6.) 
Inserting 5.6. into 5.5. yields: 
X KX F K F ⋅ = ⋅ β  and  X NX F ) 1 ( N F ⋅ − = ⋅ β . (5.7.) 
Finally, inserting 5.7. into the first-order condition 5.4. leads to: 
. P F X X =  (5.8.) 
As is clear from 5.8., the supply of the public good will be efficient in equilibrium. This 
finding is illustrated in figure 5.1. Leviathan will raise public-goods supply up to the level 
X
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Figure 5.1.: Leviathan’s supply of public inputs 
This will change, however, when a constitutional rule of the Brennan-Buchanan type 
prohibits the taxation of the more elastic tax base N. For then, the rent equation 5.3. will 
simplify to: 
X P K ) r ) X , K , L ( F ( Q X K ⋅ − ⋅ − = . (5.9.) 
As a consequence, the first-order condition for a maximum of rents for Leviathan will 
change to: 
. P K F X KX = ⋅  (5.10.) 
Inserting 5.7. into 5.10. leads to: 
. P F X X = ⋅ β  (5.11.) 
Since 0<β<1, FX will, in any case, be above PX. Hence, as illustrated in figure 5.1., the 
supply in the public input will fall to X
u, short of its efficient level X
eff. The reason of this 
underprovision of the public good is the following (Apolte, 2001): Whereas the public input 
raises productivity of both private factors of production, government can only reap the 
benefits from the increase in productivity of capital. It ignores the productivity-enhancing 
effect of the public-goods’ supply on labor. Technically speaking, government produces a 
positive externality for the labor income. This has a discouraging effect on the provision of 
productive public goods. The resulting underprovision of public goods reduces the 
productivity of both capital and labor. Total production in the economy drops to an extent 
indicated by the shaded area in figure 5.1. 
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As a result of the prohibition to tax the broad tax base we face two sources of inefficiencies 
in a setting where governments supply public inputs: The first is the underprovision of the 
public good as analyzed in this section. The second source is the tax distortion that will be 
virulent here as much as it was the case in the examples discussed in the previous sections. 
Whether the average citizen or, for that matter, the median voter incurs a loss in net income or 
still enjoys a gain, remains an open question. It depends on the magnitude of the two 
inefficiencies on the one hand and on the magnitude of the reduction in total tax revenue on 
the other. The latter, in turn, depends on the elasticity of labor supply and on the extent to 
which some political restrictions on labor taxes apply. Whatever the net effect to the citizens 
is, however, from the point of view of the economy as a whole, the Brennan-Buchanan type 
rule will, in any case, reduce overall production. Hence, any alternative rule suitable to 
limiting tax revenues without causing the inefficiencies analyzed here would be superior to 
the rules suggested by Brennan and Buchanan.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
To be true, we are aware of the fact that we have presented merely some examples in 
which the economic effects of Brennan-Buchanan type constitutional rules turn themselves 
into the opposite of what these authors claimed in their famous book. We admit that this does 
not always need to be the case. Indeed, in some cases such rules may even work the way 
Brennan and Buchanan hope. However, it was not intended in this paper to demonstrate that 
the economic effect of these rules will, in any possible case, turn themselves upside down. 
Rather, the intention was to show that reality is more complex than has been claimed by 
Brennan and Buchanan and that this complexity needs to be considered in order to avoid 
deadly wrong conclusions.  
 
This is not to say that it is not legitimate to derive theoretical conclusions on a high level of 
abstraction. Rather, the point is that Brennan and Buchanan omitted some decisive building 
blocks of the politico-institutional framework, building blocks that do indeed matter under 
certain circumstances. To say that, however, does not mean that Brennan and Buchanan’s 
criticism of optimal taxation theory is not eligible. Quite the opposite is true, and this criticism 
seems so important and striking that it alone suffices to make the book one of the most 
important contributions to modern theory of taxation. Indeed, since the book has been 
published, optimal taxation theory is not what it used to be anymore. Public-policy 
recommendations cannot be based on optimal-taxation considerations in the traditional naïve     17
 
way alone without the risk of loosing professional reputation. However, Brennan and 
Buchanan’s strict dichotomization of their own approach on the one hand and optimal 
taxation theory on the other hand appears to be exaggerating in the light of the shortcomings 
of the Brennan-Buchan approach as they have been presented here.  
 
The crucial shortcoming of optimal taxation theory or, more generally, of welfare 
economics is that the description of governments as benevolent dictators completely misses 
the point. We always need to be well aware of this fact and we have any reason to do so 
whenever we make up our minds on questions of government activity both on the 
constitutional as well as on the post-constitutional level. However, as Sandmo (1990, p. 59) 
puts it: “I for my part do not feel that welfare economics has been destroyed by this kind of 
criticism. On the contrary I feel that welfare analysis of efficiency, market failure, and the 
design of public policies to improve efficiency has strengthened its foothold after the public 
choice criticism.”  
 
This intermediating evaluation is supported by the fact that the alternative to the concept of 
governments as benevolent dictators, the concept of governments as Leviathans in the version 
of Brennan and Buchan, also misses an important point. The problem is not the description of 
governments as Leviathans as such, i.e. as boards consisting of individuals who maximize 
their own utility rather than that of their constituency. Rather, the problem is that they 
describe the institutional framework, that is the set of restrictions under which Leviathan 
unfolds his activity, in a way which is at best questionable. Many reasonable alternative 
specifications of this set of restrictions turn the Brennan-Buchanan results on their head. That 
is the point. 
 
As one of the central shortcomings of optimal-taxation theory, Brennan and Buchanan 
criticize the optimal taxation theorists’ “obstinate neglect of the expenditure side of the 
budget” (Brennan/Buchanan, 1980, p. 14). Interestingly, though, in all but one small section 
of their book, they ignore the expenditure site, too. They justify their neglect with an 
assumption according to which governments raise taxes solely for the sake of financing 
government consumption, not for the supply of public goods. We have indeed any reason to 
suspect that government consumption is the true motivation behind all government activity in 
much the same way as it is the motivation of Adam Smith’s butcher to raise his own 
consumption rather than consumption of his customers. However, the point raised by Adam     18
 
Smith was that it is competition that forces the butcher to act as if he wanted to maximize 
utility of his customers. And this is the difference between Adam Smith’s butcher and 
Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan.  
 
Brennan and Buchanan are right in claiming that Adam Smith’s butcher is constrained in 
his income hunger by market competition, whereas there is no such (strict) restriction for 
governments. But they are obviously wrong in claiming that, at least in modern democracies 
and under the rule of law, there is no restriction to Leviathan’s revenue hunger at all (see 
Hardin, 2002, pp. 524 – 527). True, Brennan and Buchanan concede that some restrictions 
may indeed be at work in modern democracies. But they nevertheless base their reasoning on 
the worst-case scenario in which none of these restrictions apply. As a legitimization for this 
shift from reality they once again refer to Adam Smith’s picture of the butcher. Under the 
force of market competition he will always do his best for his customers, no matter what his 
real motivation is. As far as he is a selfish person, market competition will keep him in check. 
However, even if he were altruistic to a certain extend, market competition would not do any 
harm. Hence, finding the rules that will work even with the worst motivations of the market 
participants will always keep us on the secure side (Brennan/Buchanan, 1980, pp. 19 – 20).  
 
It is exactly this point which Brennan and Buchanan apply to the Leviathan problem. And 
it is exactly this point in which they are wrong. Adam Smith’s point was: If we apply market 
competition, then the provision of the people with private goods and services will (apart from 
any market failures) always be better than without market competition, no matter what the 
real motivation of the supplier is. Brennan and Buchan’s point seems to be perfectly 
analogous, but note that it is indeed very different. Their point is: If we apply constitutional 
restrictions, then the provision with public goods and services will always be better than 
without such restrictions, independently of the real motivation of government officials and (!) 
independently of the possible existence of some further restrictions to government activity. 
The fallacy of this analogy is twofold: First of all, constitutional restrictions of the Brennan 
and Buchanan type are not the same as market competition (of the Adam Smith type, if you 
want). Indeed, they could hardly be different. And secondly, it makes a considerable and even 
decisive difference whether some constitutional rules of the Brennan-Buchanan type are 
combined with some further political constraints, like democracy, or not. The welfare-
enhancing effect of a constitutional rule in a world without any further political restriction 
may turn itself into a harmful welfare reducing effect once it is combined with some other and     19
 
pretty realistic political restrictions. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, the approach by Brennan and Buchanan, as it has been published in their 
famous book The Power to Tax, is critically reexamined. In this book they claim that 
constitutional restrictions on governmental activities, mainly in the field of tax rates, can limit 
the power of selfish governments of the Leviathan type. One of the central assumptions by 
Brennan and Buchanan is that governments do not face any political restrictions in their 
power over the citizens. It is shown in this paper that once this assumption is relaxed the 
results by Brennan and Buchanan may not hold anymore. This result is exemplified by the 
analysis of constitutional rules of the Brennan-Buchanan type, combined with three different 
types of political restrictions: a utility restriction where a certain minimum utility level has to 
be left to the median voter, a demand restriction for public goods and some restrictions that 
arise in the case of the supply of productive public goods by a government. In all these cases, 
the theoretical results as well as their normative implications even turn themselves upside 
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